CONSELHO CONSULTIVO - 26.JUL

          ETV - Diário Económico
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http://videos.sapo.pt/TBcBj4Km6KZzD7vcKHUL

CONSELHO CONSULTIVO - 19.JUL

          ETV - Diário Económico
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http://videos.sapo.pt/7t4a2NSYR41BOBvJ0HWQ

La crise en Espagne - L'Espagne a évité le sauvetage grâce à l'aide aux banques

Si l'Espagne n'avait pas demandé l'aide financière (pour ses banques), elle aurait fini par devoir être sauvée.
Car le problème était que la perception de la réalité était bien pire que la réalité elle-même. L'aide financière a permis de tout mettre sur la table, avec les tests de résistance exigés des banques espagnoles pour déterminer l'ampleur de leurs besoins de capitaux.
L'Espagne, en récession depuis fin 2011, avait été l'objet de très vives inquiétudes des marchés en 2012, ce qui avait fait exploser ses coûts de financement et l'avait presque forcée à solliciter un sauvetage européen pour l'ensemble de son économie.

Cette aide s'est finalement limitée au secteur bancaire, fragilisé depuis l'éclatement de la bulle immobilière à laquelle il était très exposé. En juin 2012, la zone euro lui a accordé une enveloppe de jusqu'à 100 milliards d'euros, dont les banques ont reçu 41,3 milliards.
L'Espagne ne songe pas à demander plus de fonds: il faudrait négocier un nouveau contrat et la question ne se pose pas car les doutes ont été levés et le Trésor se finance sur les marchés.
 
Le Gouvernement espagnol dit que «La récession est passée. La question porte désormais sur la vigueur de la reprise». De toutes maniéres, je ne pense pas comme ça.

Le produit intérieur brut de l'Espagne a reculé de 0,5 % au premier trimestre 2013, marquant le septième trimestre consécutif de baisse. Sur l'ensemble de 2013, le gouvernement prévoit une contraction du PIB de 1,3 %.
Le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) prévoit lui un repli du PIB de l'Espagne de 1,6 % en 2013. S'il avait estimé, dans son rapport annuel sur l'Espagne publié le 19 juin, que le pays pourrait bientôt sortir de la récession, il avait aussi prévenu que «les perspectives restent difficiles».

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Empresas Não Financeiras
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Non-Financial Corporations
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
	Crédito Concedido				Cobrança Duvidosa
Installment Credit				Uncertain Collection
	MAI.12	110.737			9.426
	MAI.13	104.506	-5,63%		11.825	25,45%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Particulares
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Private Individuals
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
Crédito		Concedido		Cobrança Duvidosa
Banking Credit	Installment Credit			Uncertain Collection
Habitação	MAI.12	112.041			2.108
Mortgage	MAI.13	108.040	-3,57%		2.322	10,15%
Consumo	MAI.12	14.109			1.545
Consumption	MAI.13	12.630	-10,48%		1.520	-1,62%
Outros Fins	MAI.12	11.371			1.185
Another Finality	MAI.13	10.647	-6,37%		1.336	12,74%
Total	MAI.12	137.521			4.838
Total	MAI.13	131.317	-4,51%		5.179	7,05%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank

Europe's Problems Cannot Be Solved by Deflation on the Periphery

The crisis of the eurozone did not happen because the southern states failed to enact German-style labour market reforms. The crisis was a transatlantic banking crisis from which the German banks were in no way exempt. Labour market reforms would also have done almost nothing to address the underlying institutional problems that are to blame for diverging competitiveness within the eurozone.

Now Europe is in a desperate mess that simply cannot be solved by deflation on the periphery…. Unemployment rates are terrifyingly high. This is a toxic mix and one that is politically unsustainable.What can be done?
First, banking union needs to go ahead because the crisis in the sector cannot be solved solely with sovereign backstops. That means a single supervisory mechanism, a European resolution authority and deposit insurance scheme.
Secondly, some fiscal integration is needed as otherwise at some point peripheral sovereigns must default…. A common eurozone budget is needed; eurobonds can no longer be a taboo. Europe’s monetary union always implied some measure of fiscal union. Those who signed the Maastricht treaty either should have known it – or knew it and should have admitted it….But, in return, there needs to be meaningful structural reform in all eurozone states.
The German belief in a quid pro quo is quite right. The illusion was to imagine that such reform could somehow be induced via a fiscal compact--Ms Merkel’s attempt to Germanise the periphery….The German Michel… [is] returning to the Michel of the pre-1848 era, that Biedermeier figure much given to self-pity over the extortion perpetrated against him by his wily neighbours. That may be good domestic politics.
It may even help Ms Merkel secure re-election in September. But it is really terrible economics.

Is it the end of the European crisis?

Politicians say the eurozone is recovering, but poverty and unemployment persist.   So declared beleaguered French President Francois Hollande on a trip to Japan in June. His voice has also been joined by those of Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, and Jose Manuel Barroso, head of the European Commission - both major players in pulling the eurozone out of its financial black hole.   The eurozone has been plagued by economic woes since the global financial collapse in 2008. Infighting between member states has exacerbated the problem and delayed vital policies from coming into effect - such as the EU budget, agreed at the 11th hour after a series of compromises. The 17 eurozone countries use a common currency, but do not have a common government. As a result, the countries often pull in different political directions. Countries with weaker economies resent the performance of the area's stronger ones, who in turn resent bailing out their struggling neighbours. And economically uncompetitive countries, such as Greece, cannot boost exports by devaluing their currency, which they could have done before adopting the euro. Germany's economy remains strong, with an unemployment rate of just 5.4 percent as of April 2013 - though sluggish growth is forecast through 2014. But when compared to Greece, where 26 percent are out of work, it is easy to see why anti-German sentiment is growing within Europe, especially with German Chancellor Angela Merkel's persistence in pushing for strict austerity policies across the continent.

CONSELHO CONSULTIVO - 12.JUL

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http://videos.sapo.pt/qqoYwoTq6OzybpGJeO7Z

CONSELHO CONSULTIVO - 5.JUL

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http://videos.sapo.pt/8CGLVUGCoplsnt9MOZRV