Credit Suisse bosses slash their bonuses by 40% to head off revolt

Credit Suisse bosses have cut their bonuses by 40% in the hope of avoiding an embarrassing protest by shareholders and politicians at the bank’s annual meeting.

The bank’s executives, had proposed paying themselves bonuses totalling 78m Swiss francs (£62m) even though the Swiss bank lost SFr2.7bn last year and has been fined $5.3bn (£4.2bn) by the US authorities for its role in the subprime mortgage crisis.

Institutional investors and Swiss politicians had publicly criticised the bumper payouts – including a total of SFr12m for Thiam - and vowed to vote against the awards at the bank’s AGM later this month.

The bank, which had defended the planned bonuses as recently as Thursday, announced it was reducing the awards early on Friday morning. “I hope that this decision will alleviate some of the concerns expressed by some shareholders and will allow the executive team to continue to focus on the task at hand,” CEO said in a letter to investors published on the bank’s website. “My highest priority is to see through the turnaround of Credit Suisse which is under way.”

Three shareholder advisory services, including the influential Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS), had urged shareholders to vote down the pay awards. “Despite a second consecutive net loss, variable remuneration levels for the executive board remained high, including a SFr4.17m short-term incentive for the CEO,” said ISS, which advises more than 1,700 of the world’s biggest investors.

Shareholder votes on executive pay are binding in Switzerland. If Credit Suisse had lost the vote, it would have been the first major veto since the so-called “fat cat law” came into force four years ago and would serve as a major embarrassment for the bank.

“If corporate governance is correct and the company has worked well and has a good annual result, then yes, some of [the profits] should be distributed,” said Minder, who led a 2013 referendum resulting in the implementation of the binding shareholder vote on executive pay. “But if it worked badly, like Credit Suisse, then, dear me, nothing can be allowed to be paid out.”
 

GOVERNADOR DO BP – AGARRADO AO PODER

Todos os cidadãos, devem pautar o seu comportamento por standards de urbanidade, cidadania, respeito cívico e ético.

Quando um cidadão, tem elevadas responsabilidades politicas, de direcção ou de alguma forma, se situa num patamar de grande influência, o escrutínio (seja lá de onde ele vier), será certamente muito exigente e implacável.

Perante, uma situação que de antemão se prevê dura, qualquer cidadão tem que ser exemplar, sob pena dos holofotes da desconfiança estarem permanentemente focados sobre si, e a sua credibilidade e autoridade, se poderem esboroar como fina areia de um deserto onde esse cidadão se deixou enredar e dificilmente sairá.

Vem a propósito, com os episódios bem conhecidos de todos, relativamente ao (ainda) Governador do Banco de Portugal.

A sua nomeação para o cargo foi um equívoco de Sócrates. Não existiam absolutamente nenhumas razões, para que Sócrates tivesse nomeado este Governador para o BP. Existiam pessoas muito mais capazes que certamente teriam, um desempenho de excepção. Mas o erro foi cometido.

Aparece Passos Coelho a insistir no erro.

Depois de toda a “trapalhada” (para não a adjectivar de outro termo mais meritório) do BES, era claro para toda a gente, que o Governador não tinha absolutamente nenhumas condições para se manter no cargo. Era claro para todas, menos para Passos Coelho.

Logo após a tomada de posse do actual Governo de António Costa, foi dado o mote, relativamente áquilo que Costa e o Ministro das Finanças, pensavam do Governador, mas este, assobiando para o ar, como se nada fosse com ele, por lá foi ficando.

Nos últimos dias, particularmente com os três programas-reportagens produzidas e apresentadas na SIC, mesmo para aqueles que não queriam ver o que aconteceu, tais reportagens vieram pôr o dedo na ferida, que é como quem diz, as grandes responsabilidades que o BP e o seu Governador tiveram em todo o caso GES/BES.

Já todos percebemos, que é o BCE e o FMI que estão a segurar o Governador, mas c’os diabos, um Homem tem dignidade e honra, e do que está à espera o Governador para colocar a viola no saco e partir para a reforma?

Além de não ter condições, as reportagens da SIC (pela dimensão e divulgação nacional que tiveram), vieram escrutinar de forma impiedosa o Governador.

O Governador chegou ao fim da linha!

Não foi de agora. Foi desde o momento em que Passos o resolveu reconduzir. Mas se ainda não percebeu, que alguém o ajude a ver que o seu caminho terminou.

É verdade, que tivemos portugueses que no passado, se agarraram à cadeira e para a largarem tiveram que ser pontapeados, ou pela vontade popular ou pela vontade dumas forças armadas que estavam fartas dum regime bafiento e podre.

Não havia necessidade deste espectáculo de praça pública em que se vitupera quem deveria ser aplaudido de forma exemplar.

O Governador não soube exercer de forma capaz a sua função, não se mostrou competente, por sua culpa e daqueles que lá o colocaram em lugar para o qual não tinha perfil.

Embora já fora de tempo, tome a única decisão sensata – demita-se!

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Particulares
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Private Individuals
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
Crédito		Concedido		Cobrança Duvidosa
Banking Credit	Installment Credit			Uncertain Collection
Habitação	DEZ.15	97.706			2.480
Mortgage	DEZ.16	94.780	-2,99%		2.331	-6,01%
Consumo	DEZ.15	12.183			1.123
Consumption	DEZ.16	13.725	12,66%		847	-24,58%
Outros Fins	DEZ.15	9.336			1.375
Another Finality	DEZ.16	8.792	-5,83%		1.356	-1,38%
Total	DEZ.15	119.224			4.978
Total	DEZ.16	117.296	-1,62%		4.534	-8,92%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Empresas Não Financeiras
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Non-Financial Corporations
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
	Crédito Concedido				Cobrança Duvidosa
Installment Credit				Uncertain Collection
	DEZ.15	81.535			12.537
	DEZ.16	77.037	-5,52%		12.092	-3,55%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank

IMF Executive Board Concludes Fifth Post-Program Monitoring with Portugal


On February 17, 2017, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Fifth Post-Program Monitoring  with Portugal.

After a sluggish first half, the economy experienced a welcome upturn in growth in the second half of 2016, boosted by stronger exports and a further decline in unemployment to pre-crisis levels.
These developments point to an improved near-term outlook, but medium-term growth could be put on a more sustainable footing by reducing structural bottlenecks and high levels of corporate debt.
The revised 2016 fiscal target appears likely to have been met, but prospective public outlays for banking sector recapitalization continue to weigh on public debt trends.
 
Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal.
They welcomed Portugal’s improved macroeconomic performance in the second half of 2016, marked by a pick‑up in growth, a decline in unemployment, and a fiscal outturn in line with the target. In addition, Portugal has continued to successfully access bond markets and its capacity to repay the Fund is expected to be adequate.
 Nonetheless, Directors noted that the public debt remains high, and the large annual financing needs, combined with banking system challenges, leave Portugal vulnerable to a range of shocks and a tightening of financing conditions. Directors, therefore, emphasized the need for a stronger momentum to improve financial sector resilience, ensure durable fiscal consolidation, and raise potential growth.

Directors welcomed the recognition by the authorities that continued efforts to improve banking sector soundness are warranted. They stressed that a comprehensive clean‑up of bank balance sheets is essential to break the vicious circle between weak banks, high non‑performing loans (NPLs), and low growth. This should include a predictable, time‑bound, and credible plan for banks to write‑off or restructure non‑performing legacy assets, strengthen internal governance, and improve bank profitability, including by further cutting costs. This would help attract new private capital to support the clean‑up of bank balance sheets. In this context, Directors were encouraged by the authorities’ proposals to address NPLs, including supervisory, legal, and judicial measures to incentivize banks to dispose of non‑performing loans and reduce corporate debt.

Directors welcomed the authorities’ commitment to continued fiscal consolidation and noted their five‑pillar strategy.
They underscored the importance of a well‑specified medium‑term fiscal adjustment path that balances the need to put debt on a firmly downward trajectory while supporting growth. They stressed that a fiscal consolidation path that relies more on durable expenditure reform and greater spending efficiency, and less on one‑off measures and capital expenditure compression, would be more sustainable and supportive of growth.
 They also noted the importance of strengthening the budget process.

Directors underscored that reinvigorating macro‑critical structural reforms remains essential to boost the economy’s competitiveness, growth potential, and resilience to shocks.
They encouraged the authorities to proceed with reforms in labor and product markets, with a particular focus on tackling labor market segmentation, improving education and skills, and enhancing public sector efficiency.
They noted that it would be important to ensure that increases in the minimum wage do not impair labor competitiveness and undermine prospects for new entrants to the labor force. Removing regulatory barriers, strengthening institutional capacity, and addressing other supply bottlenecks are also considered critical reforms.

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Particulares
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Private Individuals
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
Crédito		Concedido		Cobrança Duvidosa
Banking Credit	Installment Credit			Uncertain Collection
Habitação	NOV.15	99.104			2.558
Mortgage	NOV.16	94.745	-4,40%		2.367	-7,47%
Consumo	NOV.15	11.976			1.275
Consumption	NOV.16	13.828	15,46%		1.099	-13,80%
Outros Fins	NOV.15	9.571			1.516
Another Finality	NOV.16	8.925	-6,75%		1.384	-8,71%
Total	NOV.15	120.651			5.349
Total	NOV.16	117.499	-2,61%		4.850	-9,33%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank

	VARIAÇÕES HOMÓLOGAS
	HOMOLOGOUS CHANGE
Empréstimos de Outras Instituições Financeiras Monetárias a Empresas Não Financeiras
Loans of Other Monetary Financial Institutions to Non-Financial Corporations
					Milhões de Euros
					Millions of Euros
	Crédito Concedido				Cobrança Duvidosa
Installment Credit				Uncertain Collection
	NOV.15	83.245			13.534
	NOV.16	77.968	-6,34%		12.802	-5,41%
Fonte: Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal
Source: Portugal Central Bank